Given the extreme circumstances of this accident the local management of the accident has been conducted in the best way possible and following Fundamental Safety Principle 3.
3.3.1 Fundamental Safety Principle 3: Leadership and Management for Safety
This states that effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks.
The Mission had the opportunity to receive detailed presentations of the scenario of the accident and its technical management. These presentations were mostly given by TEPCO, at the headquarters and plant levels. Complementary presentations were also given by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the nuclear regulator, other Government Ministries and agencies. These presentations were greatly enhanced by site visits which allowed the Mission to hear and see at first hand the extremely difficult work involved, and have a concrete view of the practical conditions under which the operators had to manage the accident and to perform their interventions.
The extreme difficulties that the operators on the site had to face in Fukushima Dai-ichi have to be once again strongly underlined: loss of all the safety systems, loss of practically all the instrumentation, necessity to cope with simultaneous severe accidents on four plants, lack of human resources, lack of equipment, lack of light in the installations, and general conditions of the installation after the tsunami and after damage of the fuel resulted in hydrogen explosions and high levels of radiation. Access to outside resources and off-site communications dependent on the local telecommunication network were also severely disrupted, although the TEPCO in-house communications network between the site and headquarters had been mostly intact.
Understanding in detail the sequences of the accidents in the plants is a very complex and difficult task which has to be undertaken in the future. Many uncertainties remain today and will hopefully be resolved in the future. However, in view of the information that was provided to the Mission, it is considered that, given the circumstances, the local teams have managed the accident in the best possible way they could. Given the resources available on the site and the difficulty of the situation, it is doubtful at this stage that any better solutions than the ones actually chosen could have been realistically implemented. It is therefore concluded that:
Conclusion 2: Given the extreme circumstances of this accident the local management of the accident has been conducted in the best way possible and following Fundamental Safety Principle 3.
MISSION REPORT
ReplyDeleteTHE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE
EXPERT MISSION
IAEA INTERNATIONAL FACT FINDING EXPERT MISSION OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NPP ACCIDENT FOLLOWING THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI
Tokyo, Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP, Fukushima Dai-ni NPP and Tokai Dai-ni NPP, Japan
24 May – 2 June 2011
IAEA MISSION REPORT
DIVISION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATION SAFETY
DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY
http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/pdfplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_final-fukushima-mission_report.pdf
3.3.1 Fundamental Safety Principle 3: Leadership and Management for Safety
ReplyDeleteThis states that effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks.
The Mission had the opportunity to receive detailed presentations of the scenario of the accident and its technical management. These presentations were mostly given by TEPCO, at the headquarters and plant levels. Complementary presentations were also given by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the nuclear regulator, other Government Ministries and agencies. These presentations were greatly enhanced by site visits which allowed the Mission to hear and see at first hand the extremely difficult work involved, and have a concrete view of the practical conditions under which the operators had to manage the accident and to perform their interventions.
The extreme difficulties that the operators on the site had to face in Fukushima Dai-ichi have to be once again strongly underlined: loss of all the safety systems, loss of practically all the instrumentation, necessity to cope with simultaneous severe accidents on four plants, lack of human resources, lack of equipment, lack of light in the installations, and general conditions of the installation after the tsunami and after damage of the fuel resulted in hydrogen explosions and high levels of radiation. Access to outside resources and off-site communications dependent on the local telecommunication network were also severely disrupted, although the TEPCO in-house communications network between the site and headquarters had been mostly intact.
Understanding in detail the sequences of the accidents in the plants is a very complex and difficult task which has to be undertaken in the future. Many uncertainties remain today and will hopefully be resolved in the future. However, in view of the information that was provided to the Mission, it is considered that, given the circumstances, the local teams have managed the accident in the best possible way they could. Given the resources available on the site and the difficulty of the situation, it is doubtful at this stage that any better solutions than the ones actually chosen could have been realistically implemented. It is therefore concluded that:
Conclusion 2: Given the extreme circumstances of this accident the local management of the accident has been conducted in the best way possible and following Fundamental Safety Principle 3.