Current discourse on Japan is plagued with diction on “crises,” “challenges,” and “indecision.” While these words may suggest a nation in decline, we do not believe that is a foregone conclusion. It is our view that Japan is at a critical juncture. Japan has the power to decide between complacency and leadership at a time of strategic importance. With the dynamic changes taking place throughout the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will likely never have the same opportunity to help guide the fate of the region. In choosing leadership, Japan can secure her status as a tier-one nation and her necessary role as an equal partner in the alliance.
In a new roles and missions review, Japan should expand the scope of her responsibilities to include the defense of Japan and defense with the United States in regional contingencies. The allies require more robust, shared, and interoperable ISR capabilities and operations that extend well beyond Japanese territory. It would be a responsible authorization on the part of Japan to allow U.S. forces and JSDF to respond in full cooperation throughout the security spectrum of peacetime, tension, crisis, and war.
A report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
ReplyDeleteJapan Chair
The U.S.-Japan Alliance
Anchoring stability in asia
by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye
http://csis.org/files/publication/120810_Armitage_USJapanAlliance_Web.pdf
Current discourse on Japan is plagued with diction on “crises,” “challenges,” and “indecision.” While these words may suggest a nation in decline, we do not believe that is a foregone conclusion. It is our view that Japan is at a critical juncture. Japan has the power to decide between complacency and leadership at a time of strategic importance. With the dynamic changes taking place throughout the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will likely never have the same opportunity to help guide the fate of the region. In choosing leadership, Japan can secure her status as a tier-one nation and her necessary role as an equal partner in the alliance.
ReplyDeleteIn this period of drift, Operation Tomodachi bought the U.S.-Japan alliance some time. It gave the alliance the meaning and value it urgently needed following the idiosyncratic political discord of the last three years. But, that will not be sufficient to carry the alliance through the challenges it faces. The rapidly evolving strategic landscape and tremendous budgetary challenges require smarter and more adaptive engagement on the part of the United States and Japan. The recommendations contained in this report are an attempt to highlight areas in which the United States and Japan can move forward in that regard. Equally important will be follow-through on the part of both nations. So, as a final recommendation, we urge both the United States and Japan to evidence their commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance by appointing a policy director dedicated solely to the betterment of it. The alliance is deserving and in need of this attention.
Recommendations
ReplyDeleteRecommendations for Japan
■ Cautious resumption of nuclear power generation is the right and responsible step for Japan. Restarting nuclear reactors is the only way to meet Tokyo’s ambitious carbon dioxide emissions cuts of 25 percent by 2020. A restart is also sensible to help ensure that high energy costs coupled with a high-valued yen do not drive vital energy-dependent industries out of Japan. Taking on board lessons from Fukushima, Tokyo should resume a leadership role in promoting safe reactor designs and sound regulatory practices.
■ Tokyo should continue active engagement in multinational efforts to combat piracy, protect Persian Gulf shipping, secure sea-lanes, and confront threats to regional peace, such as those posed by Iran’s nuclear program.
■ In addition to entering TPP negotiations, Japan should examine more ambitious and comprehensive negotiations, such as the proposal for a CEESA, described in this report.
■ For the alliance to realize its full potential, Japan should confront the historical issues that continue to complicate relations with ROK. Tokyo should examine bilateral ties in a long-term strategic outlook and avoid issuing gratuitous political statements. To enhance trilateral defense cooperation, Tokyo and Seoul should work to conclude the pending GSOMIA and ACSA defense pacts and continue trilateral military engagements.
■ Tokyo should continue engagement in regional forums and with democratic partners, particularly India, Australia, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
■ In a new roles and missions review, Japan should expand the scope of her responsibilities to include the defense of Japan and defense with the United States in regional contingencies. The allies require more robust, shared, and interoperable ISR capabilities and operations that extend well beyond Japanese territory. It would be a responsible authorization on the part of Japan to allow U.S. forces and JSDF to respond in full cooperation throughout the security spectrum of peacetime, tension, crisis, and war.
■ At the first rhetorical sign or indication of Iran’s intention to close the Strait of Hormuz, Japan should unilaterally send minesweepers to the region. Japan should also increase surveillance of the South China Sea in collaboration with the United States to ensure freedom of navigation.
■ Tokyo should enhance the legal abilities of the MOD to protect bilateral and national security secrets and confidential information.
■ To enable fuller participation in PKO, Japan should extend the latitude of peacekeepers to include protecting civilians and other international peacekeepers, with force, if necessary.
Recommendations for the U.S.-Japan Alliance
ReplyDelete■ Taking on board lessons from Fukushima, Tokyo and Washington should revitalize nuclear energy research and development cooperation and promote safe nuclear reactor designs and sound regulatory practices globally.
■ As part of the security relationship, the United States and Japan should be natural resource allies. Japan and the United States should enhance cooperation in the research and development of methane hydrates and commit to development on alternative energy technologies.
■ Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul should expand track 2 dialogue on historical issues, seek consensus on how to approach these sensitive matters, and take suggestions and recommendations derived from dialogue to political and government leaders for action. This effort should seek agreement on “best practice” norms and principles about interaction on these difficult issues.
■ The alliance must develop capabilities and policies to respond to China’s re-rise. The alliance has much to gain from a peaceful and prosperous China, but continued high economic growth and political stability are not assured. Allied policies and capabilities should be adaptable to China’s possibly expanding core interests, changing trajectory, and a broad range of possible futures.
■ Developing a concrete action agenda on human rights is an admirable goal, especially in Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, and Vietnam, where allied commitments can advance international humanitarian law and civil society. With regard to North Korea, the alliance with ROK should address the whole range of humanitarian issues, including food security, disaster relief, and public health, in addition to denuclearization and abductees.
■ The United States and Japan should align concepts such as Air Sea Battle and Dynamic Defense through the Roles, Missions, and Capabilities dialogue, which has received insufficient seniorlevel attention to date. A new roles and missions review should include a broader geographic scope as well as an all-inclusive combination of allied military, political, and economic national powers.
■ U.S. Army/Marine Corps cooperation with JGSDF should make progress toward interoperability and move toward an amphibious, agile, and deployable force posture.
■ The United States and Japan should improve the quality of their bilateral defense exercises by utilizing rotating civilian airports, testing lessons learned from Operation Tomodachi, and enhancing amphibious capabilities. The United States and Japan should make full use of training opportunities in Guam, CNMI, and Australia, both bilaterally and with other partners.
■ The United States and Japan should increase opportunities for joint development of future weaponry. A near-term armament program should consider specific projects of mutual interest and operational requirements. The alliance should also identify long-term operational requirements for joint development.
■ The United States and Japan should reinvigorate the extended deterrence dialogue (perhaps in conjunction with ROK) to ensure equal confidence in the credibility and capability of U.S. extended deterrence over its key allies.
■ The United States and Japan should establish a Joint Cyber Security Center for research and implementation of common information assurance standards.
Recommendations for the United States
ReplyDelete■ The United States should not resort to resource nationalism nor inhibit private-sector plans to export LNG. At a time of crisis, the United States should provide its ally with a constant and stable flow of LNG. Congress should amend the law to remove the FTA requirement for an automatic energy permit, putting Japan on an equal footing with other potential natural gas customers.
■ With its leadership role in TPP negotiations, the United States should shed more light on the negotiation process and drafting of agreements. Japan’s participation in TPP should be viewed as a strategic objective of the United States.
■ The United States should not render judgment on the sensitive historical issues between Japan and ROK. The United States should, however, exert full diplomatic efforts to diffuse tensions and refocus attention to the two nations’ core national security interests.
■ USFJ should have specific responsibilities assigned for the defense of Japan. The United States needs to allocate greater responsibility and sense of mission to USFJ.
■ The United States should take advantage of the relaxation of the “Three Principles on Arms Exports” and encourage the Japanese defense industry to export technology not only to the United States, but to other allies such as Australia. The United States must review its own archaic and obstructive FMS process.
■ The United States should better integrate and invigorate the Sciences and Technology Forum with the policy-centered Security Consultative Committee structure to further promote joint research and development and technology cooperation and should work to improve and streamline the defense sales bureaucracy to ensure timely and strategically consistent decisions.
■ The United States should select a presidential appointee and charge that individual with responsibilities for the enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan may want to consider a similar designation.