Global stocks of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, 2010
(tonnes)
(tonnes)
| State | Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU) |
Separated plutonium | |
| Military | Civilian | ||
| China | 16.0 | 1.8 | 0.0 |
| France | 31.0 | 6.0 | 55.9 |
| India | 1.3 | 0.5 | 3.7 |
| Israel | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| North Korea | 0.0 | 0.034 | 0.0 |
| Pakistan | 2.6 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Russia
(to be blended down) |
670.0
(+104.0) |
128.0 | 47.7 |
| UK | 21.2 | 7.6 | 85.3 |
| USA
(to be blended down) |
510.0
(+104.0) |
92.0 | 0.0 |
| Non-nuclear
weapon states |
20 | 0.0 | 55.6 |
| Germany | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.5 |
| Japan | 0.0 | 0.0 | 46.1 |
| Total
(to be blended down) |
1,270.0
(+208.0) |
237.7 | 248.8 |
Global stocks and production of fissile materials, 2010
ReplyDeleteby International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM)
http://fissilematerials.org/publications/2011/06/global_stocks_and_production_o.html
Appendix 7A. Global stocks and production of fissile materials, 2010, in SIPRI Yearbook 2011
http://fissilematerials.org/library/SIPRIYB1107A.pdf
by Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian
Materials that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction are essential for all types of nuclear explosives, from first-generation fission weapons to advanced thermonuclear weapons. The most common of these fissile materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium of almost any isotopic composition. This appendix gives details of current stocks of HEU and separated plutonium, including in weapons, and details of the current capacity to produce these materials. The information in the tables is based on new estimates prepared for the Global Fissile Material Report 2010 of the International Panel on Fissile Materials.
The production of HEU and plutonium both start with natural uranium. Natural uranium consists almost entirely of the non-chain-reacting isotope U-238, with about 0.7 per cent U-235, but the concentration of U-235 can be increased through enrichment—typically using gas centrifuges. Uranium that has been enriched to less than 20 per cent U-235 (typically, 3–5 per cent)—known as low-enriched uranium (LEU)—is suitable for use in power reactors. Uranium that has been enriched to contain at least 20 per cent U-235—known as HEU—is generally taken to be the lowest concentration practicable for use in weapons. However, in order to minimize the mass of the nuclear explosive, weapon-grade uranium is usually enriched to over 90 per cent in U-235.
Plutonium is produced in nuclear reactors through the exposure of U-238 to neutrons and is subsequently chemically separated from spent fuel in a reprocessing operation. Plutonium comes in a variety of isotopic mixtures, and most such mixtures are weapon-usable. Weapon designers prefer to work with a mixture that is predominantly Pu-239 because of its relatively low rate of spontaneous emission of neutrons and gamma rays and the low generation of heat through this radioactive decay. Weapon-grade plutonium typically contains more than 90 per cent of the isotope Pu-239. The plutonium in typical spent fuel from power reactors (reactor-grade plutonium) contains 50–60 per cent Pu-239 but is weapon-usable, even in a first-generation weapon design.
The five nuclear weapon states party to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—have produced both HEU and plutonium. India, Israel and North Korea have produced mainly plutonium, and Pakistan mainly HEU for weapons. All states with a civilian nuclear industry have some capability to produce fissile materials.
International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM)
ReplyDeletehttp://fissilematerials.org/
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
http://www.sipri.org/