... Chomsky is not inconsistent ... when he claims to be both a libertarian and a socialist. His socialism poses no particular problems: it is about the need for and the way in which humans organise and live together collectively as individuals. The values of freedom and equality are not mutually exclusive. Chomsky's views on human nature lend his particular position on libertarian socialism greater authority. Liberty and equality are not only interdependent and progressive values, since, in Chomsky's view, they are also necessary to or preferable for the healthy development of the human condition. Chomsky's evidence for such a necessity is far from concrete, as he admits. However, his work in linguistics is certainly suggestive of such a claim. Further it has been argued that for Chomsky freedom and equality are not absolute concepts but are not absolute concepts but are always relative to objective reality. As such Chomsky cannot be accused of teleologucal thinking. By this view then, there is no 'end' to history. But there can nevertheless be progress.
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The liberal individual is autonomous, rational, self-interested and self-determining. These characteristics are a priori given, and as such are not influenced by the nature and character of the society in which individuals co-exist.
http://chomsky.info/onchomsky/1999----.pdf
ReplyDelete"Manufacturing Consistency:
ReplyDeleteSocial Science, Rhetoric and Chomsky’s Critique"
by Alison Edgley
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/35117/WPCC-Vol6-No2-Alison_Edgley.pdf
"The social and political thought of Noam Chomsky"
by Alison Edgley
http://books.google.com/books?id=pgOTJIhfJQcC&pg=PA72&lpg=PA72&dq=This+chapter+has+argued+that+Chomsky+is+not+inconsistent,+as+some+have+tried+to+show&source=bl&ots=sJQs0wFL7P&sig=UkwYCRHvaNiwrqCo41IRvv1lbgI&hl=en&ei=5G3OTtr_NYTx0gGr1vmSBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=This%20chapter%20has%20argued%20that%20Chomsky%20is%20not%20inconsistent%2C%20as%20some%20have%20tried%20to%20show&f=false
This chapter has argued that Chomsky is not inconsistent, as some have tried to show, when he claims to be both a libertarian and a socialist. His socialism poses no particular problems: it is about the need for and the way in which humans organise and live together collectively as individuals. The values of freedom and equality are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, as the libertarian socialist or anarchist tradition has itself always maintained, equality should not only mean equality in terms of access to resources, but to remain meaningful should also include political equality so that individuals are given the liberty to take part in decision-making processes. In other words, for libertarian socialists, equality is shorn of its progressive value if it is to simply involve a body such as the state determining productive output and distribution. Similarly, freedom or liberty is meaningless if the distribution of resources in a society is inegalitarian, because a lack of resources by definition will constrain an individual's freedom.
ReplyDeleteChomsky's views on human nature lend his particular position on libertarian socialism greater authority. Liberty and equality are not only interdependent and progressive values, since, in Chomsky's view, they are also necessary to or preferable for the healthy development of the human condition. Chomsky's evidence for such a necessity is far from concrete, as he admits. However, his work in linguistics is certainly suggestive of such a claim. The liberal and communitarian debate has also grappled with the concepts of liberty and equality, raising serious problems about the possibility of reconciling the two values. This suggested the interesting possibility of looking at Chomsky's views in the light of this debate and specifically the aspect of the debate between Rawls and Sandel. A key feature of this debate directly concerns itself with this question of human nature. According to Sandel the liberal position on social organisation implicitly posits a conception of the person. The liberal individual is autonomous, rational, self-interested and self-determining. These characteristics are a priori given, and as such are not influenced by the nature and character of the society in which individuals co-exist. Sandel, in criticising Rawls' conception of the individual, raises the possibility of a very different conception of the individual. In so doing Sandel questions the whole notion of a human nature in any a priori sense. For the communitarian, human beings are to a large extent formed by the society from which they come. Subjects are, in this view, constructed, and the goals or ends chosen are constitutive of the self. In Sandel's view it is Rawls'